Understanding regional inequalities in small countries, Regional Studies 39, 647-658. This paper revisits the commonly held view that small countries do not exhibit significant regional disparities. The issue is framed as one in which the attributes of small size (land area, population and the magnitude of the economy) are mediated by a series of spatial and non-spatial factors such as distance, density, factor mobility, natural resources, land supply, social cohesion and governance structure. Given the existence of these mediators, the magnitude of regional disparities in small countries is not as surprising as it may seem at first glance. Cet article cherche à voir sous un nouveau jour l'idée reçue que les petits pays ne font pas preuve d'importants écarts régionaux. La question se voit relativiser en termes de la médiation des atouts de la petitesse (superficie, population et taille économique) par une série de facteurs à la fois géographiques et non-géographiques, tels la distance, la densité, la mobilité des facteurs, les ressources naturelles, le marché foncier, la cohésion sociale et la structure administrative. Vu la présence de ces facteurs médiateurs-là, l'ampleur des écarts régionaux des petits pays s'avère moins surprenant que l'on n'aurait pu penser à première vue. Este artículo trata nuevamente la visión comúnmente sostenida en torno a que los países pequeños no muestran desigualdades regionales significativas. Esta cuestión se examina dentro de un marco en el que las características que se le atribuyen a los países pequeños (terreno, población y magnitud de la economía) se ven mediadas por una serie de factores espaciales y no espaciales tales como la distancia, la densidad, movilidad factorial, recursos naturales, provisión de terreno, cohesión social y estructura de gobernanza. Dada la existencia de tales factores mediadores, la magnitud de las desigualdades regionales que se observan en los países pequeños no es tan sorprendente como puede parecer a primera vista.
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Developed small states seem to have succeeded in spreading than with any particular interest in interregional gaps.
the fruits of economic growth more widely among their
In a recent volume, F and P populations than the larger states at comparable levels of (2005) attempted to fill this void by focusing on the income per capita.
small, developed countries that form the mainstay of (K, 1960, p. 30) much of the modern world economy and many of whom have become models of economic development and global competitiveness in their own right.
INTRODUCTION
Regional growth theory offers contradictory evidence on the permanence of regional disparities. NeoThe above quotation reflects a commonly held notion classical growth theory, as developed in the context that small countries have small regional disparities. In of international trade and applied to regions, and the address from which this quotation is taken, Kuznets S's (1934/61 ) theory of economic expannoted that he did not really have any empirical evidence sion, both assert that competitive forces and interto bolster this claim. However, he continued that:
regional migration of labour and capital equalize it is my belief that income is distributed more equally differences and factor prices across regions and lead to among the populations in the Scandinavian countries and more even regional development (H, 1958; Switzerland than say in France, Germany or even the S, 1969; R, 1977) . In contrast, United States. . . . These smaller countries have no proporthe so-called 'new economic geography' suggests the tionately large regions like our South with a per capita opposite: the uneven concentration of production that income distinctly lower than the rest of the country.
manifests itself, inter alia, in a 'core-periphery geo- (p. 30) graphy', is sustained by circular production linkages Kuznets is not alone in voicing these sentiments. Similar and may become increasingly entrenched over time views also appear in discussions of the impacts of (K, 1991; B et al., 2001 ; F country size on economic development. For example, et al., 2001) . However, much of the evidence in both S (1993, p. 199) claims that 'in small developed directions is based on large countries such as US countries there seems to be less inequality in income states or areas within a supra-national economy such distribution than in large ones'. P and S as the European Union (EU) (A, 1995; (1989, p. 1694) state similarly that: T, 2000; L G and E, 2003) .
if inequality between regions in a country is a major But just how relevant are these theories for small source of inequality between households, then one would countries generally characterized by small land area and expect large countries to have greater regional diversity small population size? These two determining attributes and hence higher levels of inequality.
lead to a slew of implications with respect to regional disparities. If distances are shorter, access costs are lower, This critical survey revisits the 'belief ' that small the number of regions (and therefore interregional countries (which are often not much larger than regions variance) smaller, government structures more centralin a large country) do not exhibit significant regional ized and population more homogenous, then ostensibly, differences. The motivation for this reassessment follows this should point to narrower disparities across regions in the wake of a recent surge of interest in 'micro' and in small countries. 'peripheral' economies that has tended to look at the On the other hand, it can be argued that certain way remoteness and smallness impact on their economic unique features of small countries may mitigate any performance (A and R, 1995, 2003; regional convergence. For example, even in small coun- B, 2004; P, 2004) . Much of this interest tries, physical distance between central cities, which are is focused on tiny island or city-states, protectorates main centres of employment, and hinterland regions and autonomous or dependent territories with some may surpass those practicable for daily commuting. measure of political sovereignty. This literature, howTherefore, any interregional income equalization in ever, studiously avoids the issue of interregional such countries or spillover effects cannot but be limited inequalities. In all likelihood, the tiny physical scale of in scope. Furthermore, small countries are, most often, these micro or city-states implies that interregional densely populated. This may lead to the emergence of differences are virtually meaningless. A tradition of considerable diseconomies of agglomeration, not only interest in small countries also exists in the development in their central areas, but also in their hinterlands. economics literature (S, 1993; B, Although in small, densely populated countries a signifi-1995; E and K, 2000; B cant density gradient may exist between the core and W, 2001). But again, this has been more and periphery, over-concentration of population and concerned with questions of volatility and vulnerability in the national economies of undeveloped countries economic activities in the central, densely populated regions may result in especially high land costs, transport experienced by different individuals or groups. Objectively, size may be measured by three different, although congestions and other essential 'prerequisites' of disagglomeration economies. Whereas in large countries, interdependent, parameters: land area, population and economy. For the purpose of this paper, the latter such diseconomies may be concentrated at major metropolitan areas, in small countries where distances and criterion (economy) is more or less a non-starter. By defining a country as small, based solely on economic travel times are shorter, they may spread over the entire national territory, resulting in considerable gradients performance, land-endowed giants such as Ukraine and Byelorussia, as well most African, Middle East and of transport outlays and general production costs. In addition, small countries are often characterized by a Central Asian nations, are included. The physical magnitude of a country (measured by dependence on external markets, international trade and the global economy (P, 2004) . These activities either population size of land area) would seem to dictate a whole string of attributes in which cause and are invariably conducted from the major population centres, leaving peripheral areas at a distinct disadvantage effect are clearly delimited. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia) have deteriorated considerably. size-related factors on the magnitude of regional disparities, using statistical data available for both large and Context and spatial scale are also important here. At certain levels of analysis such as the supra-national, a small European countries The concluding section defines the general pattern of the relationship between country may be considered 'small' with all the implications that accompany this categorization. At other levels country size and regional inequality.
of aggregation, such as the trade-bloc, the same physical unit of territory or magnitude of economy, may assume a different relative size. These issues of absolute or FRAMING THE ISSUE: COUNTRY relative scale are further compounded when dealing SIZE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS with regions within countries. If a country is small, then its regions may also be sized in proportion. If Ostensibly, size would seem to be a concrete physical notion that is easily observed and measured. It is hardly regions are simply countries writ small, then all the attributes relating to small countries should equally an elusive concept that is differently perceived and apply (and sometimes with greater potency) to their large land mass and small population or with a large but poor population could both be considered 'small' regions. For example, if small countries are open economic systems, then their regions can be considered under these terms. On the supply side, a small country is characterized particularly exposed. If small countries are assumed to be culturally homogenous and socially cohesive, then by resource constraints. A labour supply constraint is likely to exist. However, in developed small countries, their regions are assumed to exhibit these attributes even more pronouncedly.
such as those featured below, this can work to their advantage. Constraints on the domestic supply of labour But are regional characteristics just reflections of national characteristics? If this is the case, then small invariably result in an emphasis on developing highskill human capital for high value added production. countries with more equitable distributions of income and product at the national level should also have Labour market equilibrium and low-level labour supply can be attained via in and out-migration, especially smaller regional disparities. Indeed, some economists tend to consider country size a non-issue in terms of when small countries are part of a larger continent, as in Europe (A and R, 2002) . In other economic theory (B, 2005) . This stems from a viewpoint that relates to countries or regions as small countries, labour supply constraints coupled with the competitiveness and vagaries of the world market individuals rather than groups and ignores their size differences (A, 1995; S-I-M, in they are forced to compete, leave the small country in a vulnerable position (B, 1995). 1996) .
1 An alternative view, however, is that the size of a region does matter and that each region is a group of If physical area defines the small country, the land supply constraint is likely to be a particularly acute municipalities, etc. (O'L, 2001; D  F, 2002) . As H (1962) points out, small groups are issue. On the one hand, a small land area makes for a small agricultural sector. This is a source of advantage inherently distinguished from their larger counterparts by a number of distinctive characteristics: greater ability for a small, developed economy (A and R, 2002) . On the other hand, as B for self-organization, stronger social cohesion, and smaller differences in goals and values among individual (2005) points out, a limited land supply in small countries makes for limited stocks of building land and these group members.
Many of these 'small group' characteristics are largely are generally not uniformly distributed. As land and housing services are obviously non-tradable goods, they applicable to small countries. The small countries literature abounds with descriptions of the defining attributes are likely to reinforce regional differences in small countries to a greater extent than in large countries. of small nations. As noted above, much of this is grounded in the development economics tradition
With an open economy dependent on imports to meet local consumption demands, the small country and as such focuses on micro, island and city-states (A et al., 2000; B, 2004; R, invariably finds itself subject to exogenous forces that determine many of its macro-economic parameters 2004). The size definition used is invariably based on land area, population size or GDP pc , where GDP is such as exchange rates, domestic price levels, etc. In such circumstances, the small country may align with a Gross Domestic Product. Most studies outline an upper size limit on the basis of statistical techniques supra-national body such as the EU in order to try and mediate some of the liabilities of smallness (M, (C, 2002) or 'natural' break points in the size distribution. These, however, remain arbitrary choices.
1960; C   E C-, 1998). This, however, results in limiting the Work by Armstrong and colleagues suggest a 3 million population cut-off (A and R, 1995; countries' ability to effect an independent macroeconomic policy via the monetary and fiscal tools at its A et al., 1998) ; others opt for a 5 million cut-off point (B and W, 2001) , disposal. All this would seem to point to size as a key a 10-15 million population break (R, 1960) or a land area of 65 000 km 2 ( J, 1982), etc. What conditioning factor in the economic performance of small states and the sub-optimality associated with does emerge, however, is that over time, the growing complexity and diversity of 'small' economies makes being small (limited, high-cost local production, lower incomes, etc.). However, the empirics do not seem to issues of size as measured by standard population or territorial indicators increasingly difficult to defend. support his view. A and S (2003) show that small country size improves economic perforThe archetypal profile of the small country as portrayed in the development economics literature is mance in the presence of a free trade regime. Work by Armstrong and colleagues has shown that micro-states one primarily characterized by small local markets, dependence on exports and an inability to reach scale perform as well and sometimes better than their adjacent regions (A and R, 1995; A economies (S, 1960; S, 1993) . This is a prime feature that distinguishes large countries from et al., 1998) and their income levels tend to converge to those of their patron economies (B, 2004) . the small, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. It is also an attribute that is not directly dependent on
In addition, the empirical findings coming out of the development economics literature and attempting land or population size. Conceivably, a country with a to link size to economic performance are often ambigu-REGIONAL OUTCOMES ARISING FROM SMALL SIZE ous (P and S, 1989; M and W, 1993) .
A priori deduction of the relationship between country The attributes of small size extend beyond its impact size and regional disparities does not point unambiguon economic performance. Some consider country and ously in one direction. Table 1 sketches out some of regional size to be the outcome of a trade-off between the main expected outcomes of this relationship. Sizethe economic benefits of (large) size on the one hand related attributes are presented and their impacts in and the social and political costs of heterogeneity on terms of either regional convergence or divergence the other (A and S, 2003) . Thus, are hypothesized. In the following subsections, these country or regional size is not an exogenous 'given' impacts are considered separately for spatial and nonbut is endogenously determined, the result of choices spatial factors and discussed in turn. and preferences. Size also impacts on social cohesion and the distribution of economic welfare. Both these issues receive surprisingly short shrift in the literature.
Social cohesion and homogeneity of tastes and
Spatial influences
According to T's (1970, p. 236 ) first law of cultures may also be assumed to be greater in small countries, although the contemporary world does show geography, 'everything is related to everything else but nearby things are more related than distant things'. The various examples of small but deeply fractured countries, e.g. Serbia, Cyprus, Lebanon and Israel. On the whole, impact of interregional spillovers on regional disparities clearly follows this logic. On the one hand, shorter however, accessibility to decision-makers in small countries is arguably easier and this makes for greater social distances in small countries imply more spillovers and regional convergence. There is much evidence to consensus and solidarity. This could also be mediated by the more centralized governance systems in small suggest that knowledge-based spillovers are regionally bounded (A, 2002) and thus where distances are countries. Stronger central government and less regional governance are likely to lead to more focused policy small, spillovers are likely to promote convergence. On the other hand, small countries often have one dominant goals and greater attempts at regulating social cohesion. Political centralization in a small country is therefore metropolitan centre that casts a shadow or 'Upas Tree' effect on other regions and limits any significant interlikely to spawn fiscal centralization and this concentration of political power and budgetary control is likely regional spillover effect. For example, this effect has been noted for Helsinki, Tel Aviv and Dublin in their to be self-reinforcing. Economic activity will choose to be close to the seat of power and resources further respective regional contexts (R and G, 2005) . In addition, the dominance of the metropolitan aggravating regional disparities. On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that fiscal decentralization, centre is further entrenched as even in a small country, the distance between such a centre and the hinterland rather than political decentralization, leads to regional convergence and that this is felt more acutely in small regions generally surpasses those practicable for daily commuting (P and E, 2001 ). countries than in large (G et al., 2005) .
When compared with the big issues of vulnerability The small size of individual regions in small countries is another attribute with ambiguous effects. Small and export orientation, the question about whether small countries have a more equitable income distriburegional size means less likelihood of within-region extreme values and consequently less intraregional varition across social groups or regions is perceived as of secondary importance in defining their economic ance. This may result in more evenly developed regions. Also, the smaller size of regions makes for smaller units character. In addition, it may seem self-understood that small size implies less variation, which in turn implies of analysis and smaller aggregates are likely to show more equality. Alternatively, the small size of regions a more equitable distribution. But is this linear reasoning so obvious and is it backed by empirical evidence? means that transport costs are less an advantage to domestic suppliers. With this form of protection S (1993, p. 199) claims that 'large countries show, of course, larger inequalities by regions than small removed, the small country is likely to become more dependent on exports. This dependence on external countries'. While this claim is not backed by any estimates, other work from development economics has forces implies less freedom in setting a local policy agenda that includes regional preferences. All this can not been able to verify this statement. P and S (1989) test for a relationship between the make for greater regional divergence. The supply of land in a small country or region is size distribution of income and country size. They assume that the regional income distribution is reflected both a geographic and an economic attribute that expresses regional size and mediates its effects on income in the size distribution of income as regional inequality is one source of inequality in the distribution by size. distribution and agglomeration impacts (Fig. 1) . Land is a unique feature in the creating of interregional Based on data for 48 countries, they find no evidence to back this claim and the coefficient for size is in fact inequalities as its supply and quality vary across regions. In addition, land and the housing services it produces negative but insignificant. 
Fig. 1. Role of mediating factors
are non-tradable across regions and exogenously deteragglomeration and make regions more similar. The main geographic mediator is the supply of land that mined. Even when all other factors are mobile, the regional differences in land supply serve to ensure that determines the distribution of the housing stock and consequently the size of regions (large or small regional inequalities persist (B, 2005) . This is not just a neo-classical insight and New Economic populations).
Other attributes expected to promote regional conGeography (NEG)-inspired models arrive at similar conclusions. H's (1998) model of the forces vergence include, first, the small number of regions in a small country. Again, the law of small numbers implies promoting agglomeration takes the supply of housing land in a region as the main force promoting dispersal less extreme values and therefore more interregional equality. Where distances are shorter, one can expect and arresting agglomerative growth. In contrast to the original K (1991) formulation where declinto find a greater homogenization of tastes and cultures, more openness to change, greater national solidarity, and ing transport costs and the erosion of distance as a spatial mediator make for greater agglomeration, in the more focus in setting national priorities and executing policy. All these factors are expected to work in favour Helpman model, lower transport costs make for less of regional convergence. Finally, in a small country, tradability of certain goods especially services can often be related to population size. exogenous shocks such as mass immigration and regional policy are likely to have a greater impact on Transactions costs also play a large role in determining factor mobility and in determining the geographic promoting convergence as regions are smaller and less populous.
peripherality of regions (MC, 2004) . The evidence on the role of transactions costs in creating In certain instances, the expected outcomes seem clear cut while in others they can go either way. For interregional inequalities is, however, ambiguous. This ambiguity relates to both information/technology example, in small countries certain factors of production are expected to be more mobile because of shorter transaction costs and to goods/labour transactions costs. As the cost of transacting over space has both increased distances (labour, goods) . This is expected to lead to interregional convergence. However, small country size and decreased it is necessary to be more circumspect when examining this issue and to differentiate across also means greater discontinuities generated by national boundaries. This has a differential effect on limiting different types of activities. Thus in primary industrial activities and standardized services transaction costs have factor mobility. In developed economies, it hardly affects capital and technology but can still curtail the fallen sharply increasing factor mobility and decreasing regional imbalances. In those activities where access movement of goods and labour. These boundaries are not just national. In some instances, they also represent to specialized technology or information is of prime importance, transaction costs may have risen promoting cultural, linguistic, educational and social discontinuities as well. By constraining factor mobility, these discontifactor immobility and emphasizing the regional divide between regions with access to information/technology nuities can indirectly hamper regional convergence. Finally, as noted above, greater population densities and and those without. Factor mobility and transaction costs are thus intithe acute shortage of land for new development, which are more likely to be found in small countries than mately linked to regional disparities. As P (1999) has shown, when trade costs are high, economic activity in their larger counterparts, can lead to more severe diseconomies of scale in the central core region of the will spread across regions to meet consumer final demand mediating regional disparities. However, when small country, leading to either a metropolitan shadow effect on the surrounding area or alternatively, to growth trade costs fall, agglomeration will occur and regional inequalities will become entrenched. Again, this is spillover.
contingent on labour mobility. While lower transaction costs may bring more interregional equality in ecoNon-spatial factors nomic activity, if labour is not correspondingly mobile then interregional income gaps will persist. Foremost amongst the non-spatial factors unambiguously expected to promote regional divergence is the openness of the economy of the small country. This REGIONAL DISPARITIES AND leads to dependence on external economic forces (trade, COUNTRY SIZE: AN EMPIRICAL sources of supply) and in general less independence in TEST setting social and regional priorities. This is expected to promote regional divergence. As noted above, the To provide some initial indication of whether our assumptions concerning the effect of smallness outlined centralized governance structure characteristic of small countries is also expected to work against regional in the previous section are justified, a simple test is undertaken. The magnitude of regional economic convergence. A strong unitary system of government is less likely to consider regional budgeting or other forms disparities is estimated as a function of smallness controlling for select country attributes (i.e. population, land of decentralization likely to promote regional fiscal autonomy.
area, national GDP, etc.). Some 22 countries are covered in this analysis for As noted above, the supply of land is a unique attribute with considerable economic and spatial effects whom complete and comparable data are available. Most of the countries are located in Western, Central, on income distribution, the development of agglomerations, etc. All these derive from the fixity of land. Factor
Northern and Southern Europe. In particular, the sample covers most EU and EU-candidate countries, mobility can be taken as the obverse of immobile land supply. Capital, labour, goods and technology are all plus some others such as Norway, Switzerland and Israel, but it excludes micro-states such Luxembourg, mobile in differing degrees. This mobility mediates the effect of land area as a size factor. Land area may be an Malta and Cyprus, and those for which EU regional data could not be obtained (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia issue affecting the mobility of labour or goods (inducing higher transport costs) but it is hardly a factor affecting and Slovenia). The final list covers the full range of both large and small countries ranging from France, capital or technology mobility. Population size is also mediated by factor mobility (Fig. 1) . Different subGermany and Spain, on the one hand, to Slovakia, Denmark and Israel, on the other (Table 2 ). Regional sectors of the population have different propensities to commute or migrate (labour mobility) and the level of definitions for all countries are EU NUTS II regions or their equivalents in those countries for which these largest Vienna (1.56 million), in Belgium the Brabant Wallon region (358 000) is pitched against the Antwerp data are not available. While this is an administrative rather than an economic unit, it is the only comprehenmetropolitan area (1.66 million), in Ireland the Midland area (213 000) is compared with the Dublin and Mid sive level for which cross-national regional income data are readily available.
East counties (1.52 million), and in the Netherlands the Zeeland region is juxtaposed with the Zuid Holland The countries in the sample are defined as either 'large' or 'small' based on a multiplicative index of region containing the Randstad metropolitan agglomeration (3.38 million). population and land size (Table 2) . Conveniently, this index shows a distinct natural break with the 'small' In addition, for the difference across countries in the number and size of regions, the data show substantial group being bounded by Israel and Portugal at the extremes and the 'large' group by Bulgaria and France. gaps in regional GDP pc across the poorest and richest regions. Most of the countries with small ratios (\1.8) To measure the degree of unevenness of interregional distribution of population, the coefficient of variation between the richest and poorest regions are small (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, (CV) was used. The 'small' versus 'large' dichotomy seems to reflect the regional population dispersal with Portugal and Switzerland) and only a few large countries attain this ratio (e.g. Greece, Bulgaria and Sweden). In countries such as the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Israel and Slovakia having the smallest population CVs the intermediate group (1.9-2.9) large countries (France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Poland and countries such as Greece, Spain and France, the largest. However, even amongst the smaller countries, and Spain) dominate the small (Austria, Israel), while the highest ratio countries are equally divided between larger CVs are due to the presence of large metropolitan centres that dominate their regions. Thus, in Austria the small (Slovakia and Belgium) and the large (UK and Romania). the smallest region is Burgenland (278 000) and the Using ordinary least-squares regression, the effect of
The estimated results are reported in Table 3 . The smallness on regional income disparities was tested for relatively high tolerance levels (tolerance [0.1) indicate the countries featured in Table 2 . In our analysis, the that multicollinearity between predictors is within size of regional gaps was measured by two variables: acceptable limits (G, 1995) . The model for Inc_WI suggests that countries with a more uneven Ω Inc_WI: population weighted coefficient of variation population distribution tend to exhibit (all else equal), of regional GDP pc , or the Williamson Index (WI).
smaller regional gaps (tóñ3.04, p\0.01). Apparently, Ω Inc_Dif: ratio of GDP pc between the richest and uneven distribution of population, which is often associpoorest regions.
ated with a few large metropolitan centres dominating Although the latter measure (Inc_Dif ) is easy to calcua country's regional system, is associated with stronger late and interpret, it ignores the parameter's distribution central governments and less autonomous regions. between the extremes. The former measure (Inc_WI) Unsurprisingly, land area is positively related to regional corrects this drawback and permits comparison between gaps, and the size of GDP is negatively related to countries of different sizes and characterized by different regional disparities, although the effects of these two patterns of population distribution. The WI is defined predictors do not appear to be sufficiently strong as follows:
(p[0.10). Characteristically, smallness (i.e. the combination of small population size and small land area) tends to result, ceteris paribus, in larger regional gaps bó0.12, tó1.96, p\0.10) . The model coefficients also suggest the relative where A i is the number of individuals in region i, importance of spatial versus non-spatial determinants A tot is the national population, y i is the development of regional disparities. For the countries covered in the parameter observed respectively in region i (e.g. per sample, regional disparities seem to reflect mainly spatial capita income), ȳ is the national average (e.g. per capita factors (i.e. physical size and geographic distribution of national income) and n is the overall number of regions. population), while population size and the overall The variables used in the analysis as predictors are as performance of a country as a whole (captured by its follows:
per capita GDP) appear to be less significant. The second model tested (Inc_Dif ) shows fairly Ω Land: land area in 1000 km 2 .
similar results and underlies the consistency of the Ω GDP: GDP pc , US$1000 in PPS terms. predictors (Table 3 ). The range of the regional gap Ω Pop_Distrib: coefficient of variation of the popula-(measured as the ratio of GDP pc between the richest tion sizes of a country's regions. and poorest regions) increases with population size of Ω Pop: population size of a country (million residents). a country (tó2.22, p\0.05). As with the former Ω Smallness: a country-size dummy (1 for a small model, the values of Inc_Dif are smaller in more country, 0 otherwise) ( Table 2 ). Country size is defined as the multiplicative effect of land*pop.
unevenly populated countries (tóñ2.90, pO0.01). Although the effect of smallness appears to be considercountries. In this respect, territorial extent and population size are marginal issues. In some respects, the ably weaker than in the Inc_WI model, this effect is also development of supra-national entities such as the EU positive (bó0.147). In general, both models support our have resurrected the small country as a tenable political initial assumption that small countries do not necessarily and economic unit. Furthermore, small countries have have smaller regional gaps than their larger counterparts.
become much more complex economies confronting the stereotypical profile of a small country highly dependent on external markets, specializing in niche CONCLUSIONS markets and engaged in sub-optimal production. Today, The implicit question underlying this critical survey small countries such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Israel is: can we expect small countries to have smaller and Denmark all add value to a wide range of products interregional disparities? The answer to this question is:
and engage in international trade based on competitive not necessarily. There are a number of competing forces not comparative, advantage. at work in small nations such as social cohesion,
The upshot of all this for regional disparities is that availability of natural resources, population composias developed small countries increasingly become very tion, agglomeration economies, openness to external much like the large countries, the same applies with trade, etc. The combination and intensity of these forces respect to their regional disparities. There is no strong may lead in either direction: both towards regional a priori case to expect small, developed countries to be divergence and convergence. For instance, the shortage any more equitable than larger countries. These reasons of natural resources may lead to more even regional are less to do with the raw attributes of size per se and development due to the absence of initial advantage in more to do with the way size is translated into metrics regional resource endowment. Concurrently, specializathat imply small magnitude, such as density, land tion in tertiary industries and services, common to supply, etc. small and resource-poor nations, may lead to a greater concentration of regional growth in selected metropoli-NOTE tan centres and severe underdevelopment of peripheries.
